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Abstract
:
The theory of auctions and competitive bidding suggests that, under
certain conditions, seemingly different auction mechanisms result in
the same expected cost or revenue to the bid-taker. In particular, the
existing results assume bidders 1) to be risk, neutral, 2) to obtain
private information only by observing independently distributed signals,
3) to face only the two possible outcomes of "win" and "lose," and 4)
to bid as if they were following Nash equilibrium bidding strategies.
Under such conditions, the differences in how bidders bid in response to
different pricing rules offsets the differences in the rules themselves.
The extent to which such a theory predicts what actually happens in
the real world depends on how well the theory models the essence of
actual situations, and on how sensitive the theory is to its assumptions.
The literature has already established two of the assumptions— that of
risk, neutrality and that of independent signals— to be pivotal. This
paper examines a third assumption.
In particular, we allow each bidder to be faced by more than two
possible outcomes; for example, a bidder may be allowed to win any sub-
set of the objects offered for sale. Then, for risk neutral bidders
with independent private values (for each possible outcome), the expected
revenue or cost to the bid-taker at equilibrium depends only on 1) the
number of bidders, 2) the distribution of each bidder's values, 3) the
relationship between bidders' values and who wins what, and 4) the bid-
der's expected payments in some benchmark case. This establishes that
revenue equivalence is not sensitive to the number of possible outcomes
faced by each bidder.
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Introduction:
Vickrey (1961) examines the possibility that different auction
formats might give the same expected revenue to a seller of a single
object. In particular, Vickrey considers symmetric models of risk
neutral bidders, models in which each of the known number of bidders
knows his own value for the object being sold, but knows nothing about
others' value except that they are independent samples from some known
distribution. He then considers two auction formats. In the first,
the high bidder wins and pays an amount equal to his winning bid. In
the second—an approximation to the common oral auction—the high
bidder wins, but pays an amount equal to the second highest bid. At
equilibrium in the stated independent private values model, these two
auction formats yield the same expected revenue for the seller.
Myerson (1981) examines the possibility that different single
object auction formats might give the same expected revenue to the
seller more generally. He suppresses the details of the auction rales
themselves. Instead, he recognizes that each equilibrium in each auc-
tion game gives rise to some functional relationship between bidders'
values and the outcome of the auction--who wins the object, and who
pays how much. In order to arise from the equilibrium to some auction,
this functional relationship must satisfy certain properties. Given
these properties, Myerson shows that the expected revenue in an auc-
tion with independent private values depends only on 1) the number of
bidders, 2) the distribution of a bidder's value, 3) the allocation
rule—that is, the relationship between the bidders' values for the
object and who wins the object—and 4) the expected price or profit
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in some benchmark situation (for example, when all bidders have the
lowest possible value for the object). This generalizes Vickrey's
result considerably.
Milgrora and Weber (1982) go a slightly different direction.
Instead of assuming privately known values, they simply assume that
each bidder knows how his value for the object depends on each bidder's
private information. In addition, they only consider three specific
auction mechanisms—the sealed bid first price mechanism and two models
of the progressive oral auction. In the case of independent private
values, all three mechanisms generate the same expected price . for the
object at equilibrium. This result gives up the sweeping generality of
mechanisms allowed by Myerson, but in the process allows for dependent
—
or even common—values, and establishes that it is the independence of
private information (rather than of values) on which the revenue equiva-
lence really depends.
Vickrey (1962) also considers auctions with more than one, iden-
tical objects; each of the appropriate number of highest bidders wins
one object. Three different auction formats receive attention. One,
each winner pays the amount of his bid. Two, each winner pays an amount
equal to the lowest winning bid. And three, each winner pays an amount
equal to the highest losing bid. Again for the case of independent
private values, at equilibrium, each of these formats yields the same
expected revenue for the seller.
Weber (1983) goes on to a wider family of mechanisms—those in which
each of the bidders with the highest values wins the object (in other
words, mechanisms that efficiently award at most one object to a bidder).
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In addition, he allows a bidder's value Co depend on others' private
information, just as Milgrom and Weber allow for the case of a single
object. Then, each such mechanism results in the same equilibrium price
so long as it meets some appropriately specified boundary condition; for
example, the condition might be that if a bidder has the lowest possible
value for winning an object and still wins (which means that all others
must also have the same lowest possible value for the object), then a
bidder has an expected profit of zero from winning. Engelbrecht-Wiggans
(1987) extends this result to the case of a random number of objects
—
the number being independent of bidder's private information—in analyz-
ing alternatives to the first price mechanism used by the Department of
Agriculture in the Dairy Termination Program.
This paper generalizes Vickrey's results for multi-object object
auctions in much the same manner and direction as Myerson did for
Vickrey's results on single object auctions. We take a "direct reve-
lation" approach based on that of Myerson, and establish that if each,
risk neutral bidder knows his own value for each possible allocation
of objects to himself (and others' values are independent of his own
values and are unknown to him), then the seller's expected revenue
(given certain regularity) depends only on 1) the number of bidders,
2) the possible outcomes to each bidder, 3) the relationship between
bidders' values and the final allocation, and 4) the expected price
or profit in some specific benchmark situation. This generalizes the
results of Vickrey in a direction different from that of Weber—we re-
quire the more restrictive independent private values assumption, but
thereby can allow bidders to face more than one non-trivial possible
outcome, and allow mechanisms that result in inefficient outcomes. In
addition, were it not for the implicit regularity assumed (to drasti-
cally simplify the mathematical analysis), this paper would also
generalize Myerson's results.
The Model:
This section defines our model of auctions a model both of the en-
vironment within which the auction takes place as well as of the bidding
itself. In particular, imagine a fixed number of bidders, each risk
neutral; the number may be random, but its distribution must be fixed
in the sense of being exogenously specified. We look at the problem
from the viewpoint of bidder i. The problem looks the same to each
other bidder, but lumping all of the other bidders together simplifies
our notation and analysis.
As far as i is concerned, the auction may result in any one of m
different non-trivial allocatoins of the objects. Perhaps i cares
only about what objects he wins. On the other hand, perhaps i also
cares about who else wins what objects. We allow either possibility.
Let x = (x
n ,
x_ , ..., x ) denote the outcome of a vector valued
— 1 I m
random variable X_. Assume that i knows the outcome x_, and that x.
denotes his value for outcome j. Of course, i need not truthfully re-
veal his actual _x in the auction, so let y_ denote what he does reveal;
y_ may, but need not, equal x_.
The other bidders also discover something about their own values.
Let w_ denote the outcome of the vector valued random variable W.
Think of w_ as being the concatenation of all other bidders' value vec-
tors. Assume that i does not know anything about w other than that 1)
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it is an outcome of W, 2) the distribution F(*) of W, and 3) that W is
(statistically) independent of X» Just as with i, the other bidders
need not reveal w_ truthfully; let z_ denote what they do reveal.
Now imagine any bidding game—a game in which known rules trans-
late the bidders' bids into who wins what and who pays how much. Bid-
ders must decide how to bid, and presumably, their bids depend on what
they know about their values for the possible outcomes; we call the
relationship of a bidder's bids to his information his "bidding stra-
tegy." If we have a vector of bidding strategies, one for each bidder,
such that no one bidder can do better than follow his specified stra-
tegy given that all other bidders follow their strategies, then we
call this vector of strategies an "equilibrium." This equilibrium
models the bidders' behavior; specifically, if a game has at least one
equilibrium, then we presume that the bidders will bid as if they were
following their respective strategies in some one of the equilibria.
(Note that we are simply describing—not prescribing—how bidders bid;
we do not presume that bidders explicitly calculate equilibrium stra-
tegies, but merely that they act as they would have had they calcu-
lated such strategies and followed them.)
Each equilibrium to any specific bidding game induces a specific
relationship between the bidders' information and the outcome of the
game. In particular, let P_(x»^_) describe the allocation (as it
affects i) if the bidders had bid as if they had seen y_ and z_ (rather
than x_ and w_) , but had still followed their respective equilibrium
bidding strategies. Specifically, p . ( y_, z) is the probability of out-
come j to i. Likewise, let c(y_,z) describe how the expected amount
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paid by i depends on the
_y_ and z_ that the bidders plug into their
respective bidding strategies.
The fact that
_p(_y>jO and c(y^_z) describe how the outcome of the
auction to i depends on the y_ and z_ that bidders plug into their
respective equilibrium bidding strategies allows us to suppress the
inner workings of the auction itself. In fact, imagine a game in which
specified functions
_p( * ) and c( * ) directly determine the outcome as a
function of the
_y_ and z_ that the bidders report; this is the "direct
revelaton" game of Myerson. If the specified
_p
(
•
) and c(
•
) come from
an actual equilibrium to some bidding game and if i presumes that the
other bidders will report _z = w, then i can do no better than to report
_y_
= x_. Specifically, any direct revelation game arising from an
equilibrium to a bidding game has an equilibrium in which each bidder
truthfully reveals his information. Furthermore, any direct revela-
tion game can itself be viewed as being a bidding game. Thus, the set
of equilibria to bidding games corresponds to the set of equilibria to
direct revelation games in which each bidder reveals his information
truthfully. This allows us to study auctions quite generally by simply
studying truthful equilibria in direct revelation games.
The Analysis:
This section examines the direct relation games arising from
multi-object auctions with independent private values. In particular,
we derive an expression for the expected profit to i, as a function of
_P_( * ) , c( * ) , and F( • ) , when i sees x_, but reports _y. For this _p( * ) and
c(*) to have come from an equilibrium to some bidding game, the expected
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profit to i when z = w must be maximized at
_y = x_. This condition re-
stricts how c( * ) can depend on
_p_( • ) and F( • ) . Indeed, given certain
regularity, c( • ) would now be uniquely specified as soon as we fix its
value for some benchmark x_ = x~—say, the lowest value that bidder i
can have for each outcome.
Specifically, start by deriving an expression for the expected
profit U(x_,y^ to i of reporting y_ when he actually saw x_, assuming all
along that others report _z = w.
U(x_,y) = fix * £(_y_>_w) - c(y_,w))dF(w)
Note that while the allocation and the payments depend on what i
reports, his actual value for any specific allocation does not. If
P_(v_) denotes the vector of integrals |_p(_y ,w)dF(w) , and C(_y) denotes the
w_
integral /c(y_,w)dF(w)
,
then U(x_,_y) = x_ * ZfjO " C(_y)
.
w
Now we assume that the set of possible _x is connected. For a
fixed benchmark x^ and any other _x, let _t(s) denote a path from _x^ =
t(0) to _k = _t(r) for some r. Assume that P_(t_(s)) is di f ferentiable
with respect to s. (For example, in Vickrey's k-object auction, the
only nontrivial outcome to i is winning one object. For that outcome
P(x) is simply the probability ttiat at most k-1 other bidders have a
value of at least x for the object. Let t(s) = s. For continuously
distributed values, the probability P(t(s)) will be dif ferentiable with
respect to s).
For all bidders to truthfully reveal their actual _x and w_ to be an
equilibrium to the direct revelation game, _v = x_ must maximize the
expected profit U(x,y) to i. In particular,
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dU(x,t(s))
ds
= x •
s=r
dP(t(s))
ds
s=r
dC(t_(s))
ds
= 0,
s=r
Thus, if C(x_) is to be continuous in _x (as it is in Vickrey's examples,
and must in general be for it to correspond to some equilibrium) , then
C(x) - /
, = r
dC(t(q))
s=0
dq
ds + C(t(0)),
q=s
where t(r) = x_. Now, using the relationship between the derivatives
of P(') and C(
•
) implied by the previous first order condition,
s=t dP(t(q))
C(x) = / _t_(s) • •
s=0
dq
C(t(0)).
q=s
However, we should expect the integral to be independent of the path
taken. Thus, the expected amount C(x) paid by i depends only on
_p( • ) ,
F(*), the expected amount paid at some benchmark point Xr, = t(0), and
the restriction that C(x_) be continuous. This gives the following
theorem:
Theorem: For sufficiently regular allocation functions
_P.(y.>^.^ anc*
F(_w), if the expected amount C(x_) paid by i at equilibrium is to be
continuous in _x> then C(x_) depends only on the allocation function
_p(_y ,z) , the distribution F( * ) of others' values, and the value of
C(Xr>) for some fixed X-.
In particular, not only the three pricing mechanisms examined by
Vickrey, but any other mechanism that always results in each of the k
bidders who value the objects the most receiving one object each— at
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a price of zero if all bidders have the lowest possible value for
the objects—will yield the same expected revenue to the seller at
equilibrium. More generally, this theorem establishes that the reve-
nue equivalence established (with somewhat more rigor) by Myerson for
a single object depends not on the number of objects so much as on
each bidder knowing his value for each possible allocation to himself,
and that any one bidder's values are independently distributed from
any other bidders' values.
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